The main motives behind the adoption of an inflation targeting regime largely relate to the notion of credibility, transparency of monetary policy and the autonomy of the central bank, which explicitly undertakes to achieve a certain inflation target. This paper examines the effects of inflation targeting in emerging economies in relation to the degree of independence of the central bank and the credibility of monetary policy. We find effects in emerging economies with little central bank independence, so our findings suggest that the central bank's credibility, transparency and independence is a prerequisite for emerging economies to experience a decline in inflation following the adoption of inflation targeting.
Introduction
Since the 1990s, several theoretical studies (Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) , Svensson (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999) , stress that the application of inflation targeting policy by emerging central banks makes the pursuit of monetary policy more credible.
In addition, the results of empirical studies (Ball and Sheridan (2005) , Batini and Laxton (2007) , Gonçalves and Salles (2008) , Lin and Ye (2012) , Ayres & al (2014) , Aguir and Smida (2015) ) demonstrate that inflation targeting acts optimally on macroeconomic performance in developing and emerging countries that target inflation in terms of reduced level and volatility of inflation and output growth. Even in the face of shocks generated by the latest economic and financial crisis, central banks that target inflation have responded better than other banks.
These results have prompted many other emerging countries to adopt this targeting strategy as a monetary policy management system 1 , where the monetary authorities continue to make considerable progress in the conduct of the monetary policy of inflation. However, before adopting inflation targeting policy, it is important to fulfil the institutional and structural prerequisites for its implementation.
This paper aims to examine the extent to which institutional conditions may have played a role in the choice of the authorities of emerging economies to adopt inflation targeting.
Our results show the importance of taking into account institutional prerequisites in the adoption of inflation targeting. As a result, economies with low levels of dependency and/or low levels of transparency have little ability to predict inflation. All these characteristics mean that central bank loses monetary manoeuvrability necessary to reduce inflation. The article is organized as follows. Section 1, 2 and 3 discuss the literature on credibility and transparency of monetary policy and independence of central bank. Section 4 and 5 present the econometric methodology and results of the study, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
Credibility of the monetary authority
The implementation of an inflation targeting regime helps mitigate the lack of confidence that monetary authorities now inspire economic agents and in fact will strengthen the central bank's credibility in the conduct of monetary policy. 1 A survey carried out by the IMF (2010) with a wide range of central banks, no fewer than thirtythree emerging countries would have expressed the wish to adopt a strategy of inflation targeting in the longer term, seeking for the most part technical assistance from this international institution. These countries were Costa Rica, Egypt and Ukraine, with a maturity of 1 to 2 years; Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Botswana, Georgia, Morocco, Mauritius, Uganda, Pakistan, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Guinea with a deadline of 3 at 5 ; Belarus, Bolivia, China, Honduras, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Serbia, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam and Zambia with a maturity of more than 5 years.
Credibility, a concept that emerged in mid-1970s, has also received several definitions. According to F. Kydland and E. Prescott (1977) , a central bank will be credible if its policy is temporally coherent. Thus conceived, credibility requires the abandonment of discretionary policies. This recommendation is central to the approach to credibility according to R.J. Barro and D.B. Gordon (1983) . The central bank must abandon any temptation to provoke "inflation surprises" because, in the presence of well-informed agents, expected inflation is identical to actual inflation.
This temptation can be overcome by two different institutional arrangements, namely the use of a pre-commitment rule.
We find the approach of Kydland, Prescott and Barro, Gordon and the use of the theory of incentive contracts. This approach is that of Walsh (1995): incentives must be put in place to ensure that it is not in the interest of the monetary authorities to "cheat" by reversing the announced decisions.
According to these definitions and under the assumption of complete information, the transparency of the central bank appears as the necessary and sufficient condition of its credibility. Monetary policy, if it is to be effective, is based on the sequence of credibility-commitment-transparency-reactivity However, the abandonment of the complete information hypothesis leads to a radically different analysis of the relationship between transparency and credibility. In the presence of information asymmetries between private economic agents and central bank, it is no longer certain that the transparency of the latter must be sought. A central bank can hardly become credible if it does not publish its forecasts, because private agents do not have the means to know its objectives, (Geraats, 2000) .
In addition, transparency encourages the central bank to pursue its objectives when they are explicit. From the above, it is argued that inflation-control targets provide a framework for more sound political and economic decisions and a better long-term economy, and allow central banks with autonomy to adopt a more responsible and therefore more sustainable position (Aguir & Smida, 2015 The work of de Mendonça and de Guimarães e Souza (2012) presents an empirical analysis using the generalized moments, method in order to find the macroeconomic determinants of investment under inflation targeting in Brazil. The period covered by the analysis From January 2000 to September 2009. The work tests the influence of real GDP on interest rates, credit, inflation, exchange rates, public debt and credibility on private investment. According to them, it is expected that there is a positive relationship between credibility and investment. In particular, the effect on private investment of a credible rise in targeting inflation is positive and has statistical significance. An increase in credibility increases planning capacity due to lower uncertainty in the economy and concomitant increase in investment. In short, the success of targeting inflation in the Brazilian economy is an important mechanism to promote private investment. Namely, the work has found that the success of inflation targeting creates a stable macroeconomic environment that favours private investment.
Under inflation targeting, the effectiveness of monetary policy is a function of the transmission channels of monetary policy.
According to Mukherjeeand Singer (2008), the literature so far highlights four main channels of transmission (the mechanisms through which monetary policy choices affect economic activity): the traditional interest rate, Credit or lending, the exchange rate channel, and the asset price channel (Fig. 1 ). However, in most of the economic crisis, decisions are made in uncertainty and, as a result, are guided by expectations. For example, investment decisions that entrepreneurs have to take are often based on several expectations regarding different aspects such as the influence of economic policies and the state of the economy on their business. De Mendonça and de Guimarães e Souza (2012) used MCO estimates to test the impact of credibility on interest rate volatility. They concluded that a credible monetary policy implies less effort by the Central Bank of Brazil to achieve inflation targeting due to the increased ability to influence public expectations. In this sense, they suggest that high credibility is associated with lower interest rate volatility for achieving the inflation target. Under inflation targeting, changes in the short-term interest rate depend on the credibility of the regime and affect investment decisions (and, as a result, employment) across a large set of variables, including the real cost of capital, credits, exchange rates, wealth and entrepreneurs expectations.
The traditional interest rate channel derives from the standard of Keynesian theory. Effect on aggregate demand (investment and consumption: Keynesian effect) and effect on global supply.
• For investment, the change in policy rates affects the price (cost) of capital. A cut in key interest rates reduces the cost of capital => Investment increases.
• For consumption: a change in interest rates affects the household consumption plan in inter-temporal arbitrage (this depends on the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution). An increase in the interest rate favours future consumption at the expense of current consumption. If households are lending, the rise in the interest rate induces a positive income effect. The increase in the inter-est rate may also reduce the wealth (wealth effect) of households if they have financial assets (the relationship between prices and interest rates for equities, see above). The impact on consumption will therefore depend on the income effect and the wealth effect (which effect outweighs the other). The effect on supply concerns production and, more particularly, business activity.
• An increase in key interest rates affects the lending rates of the banks => financial expenses of companies increase => decrease of the profits of the companies => decrease of the activity.
• The change in policy rates may have no impact on activity if credit is rationed.
Indeed, since banks do not pass on interest rate changes to lending rates, they retain the interest rate that maximizes their expected profit on loans granted. This rate can lead to a low credit supply relative to the demand for credit.
There may be a contradictory effect of increased aggregate demand on aggregate supply. Let us suppose a fall in the interest rate which increases the wealth effect of households, then the positive wealth effect can increase the level of the interest rate via inflation => decline in output due to lower investments.
The credit channel is important because, in emerging market countries, stock markets are generally not well developed (low market capitalization and financing per share almost exclusively for large companies). The bond market (corporate bond) is poorly developed and not very liquid. However, in the case of the Brazilian economy, for example, the participation of consumers in the stock market is negligible, which makes this transmission mechanism of little importance in Brazil, Tomazzia supply of credit will increase due to a fall in interest rates, companies will favour the channel of bank credit. Knowing that the action on short-term interest rates conditions the supply of credit to banks, the key question is whether this relationship plays automatically or not. In other words, due to imperfect information on the projects to be financed (yield, risk, etc.), a downward shift in short-term interest rates does not necessarily lead to a supply of credit by banks. Asymmetry of information generates a problem of adverse selection and moral hazard.
The consequence of the anti-selection problem is the exclusion of some of the credit applicants, who may otherwise be solvent. In practice, it is usually small and medium-sized enterprises that suffer the most from credit rationing. This is for the simple reason that large companies can either rely on their own funds or rely on the possibility of financing themselves on the stock market or on their status as large companies, which facilitates their access to credit.
With regard to the exchange rate channel, in the case of an emerging market economy with a flexible exchange rate regime, the precise impact of monetary policy on exchange rates is uncertain and will depend on expectations domestic and foreign interest rates, inflation and government debt. Economists generally assume as true that high domestic interest rates lead to currency appreciation (Mishkin, 1997).
However, under certain conditions, higher interest rates cannot make the national currency more attractive. Sargent & Wallace (1981) show how rising interest rates could lead to an increase in expected inflation if households anticipate the debt will eventually have to be monetized. Blackburn and Pelloni (2005) , examined the case of Brazil and argued that for high debt levels and risk premia, higher interest rates can trigger monetary depreciations. Aizenman and Pinto, model (2005), the effect of tightening monetary policy causes a depreciation of the currency when interest rates and debt levels are quite high.
• Effect on the price level: assume an increase in the interest rate => appreciation of the currency. A direct effect of the exchange rate on prices concerns the prices of imported finished goods (in the case of small open economies). The appreciation of the currency makes imports cheaper (and exports more expensive) => Decline in the import price index. Lower import prices mean lower consumer prices, which also reduces the growth of nominal wages. Another indirect effect on prices can come from the change in aggregate demand:
The fall in the price of imported goods (= tradable goods) => an increase in the demand for these goods to the detriment of non-tradable goods: Non-tradable prices decline due to a substitution effect.
• Effect on demand: the same assumption (rise in the interest rate and appreciation of the currency). Households borrowing in foreign currency benefit from a positive income effect because repayment of the loan costs less.
• Effect on supply: same assumption (interest rate increase and currency appreciation). The effects on supply may be positive or negative: positive from the point of view of investment through the fall in the price of imported capital goods. Negative effect from the point of view of the production of tradable goods because the appreciation of the currency leads to a reduction of the competitiveness price of the exports. Possible negative effect on the production of non-tradable goods, because lower prices (due to the substitution effect) may lead to a low incentive to invest in this sector. However, these two negative effects can be offset by a positive effect of lower prices for non-tradable goods that serve as inputs for both sectors.
The effect of monetary policy on the price of assets is explained by the relationship between asset prices and interest rates.
Moreover, inflation targeting credibility positively affects the expectations of entrepreneurs because it reflects monetary stability, which is decisive for creating a favourable business environment. Miniaoui and Smida (2008) conclude that the primary objective of transparency is to "prevent the uncertainty arising from the state of the economy or its structure from acting retroactively on strategic uncertainty. It should facilitate the task of the Bank in its quest to tie public expectations to its own objectives. By setting as a new rule the use of communication, central banks seek to make the public and markets understand the object of monetary policy as well as the means used to achieve it.
Transparency of monetary policy
Effective transparency must ensure three functions, namely clarity in external communication, visibility of the public, honesty, and the effectiveness of internal information. Economic agents can only act in the right way if they have perfect information about their environment. Transparency increases the predictability and hence the effectiveness -in terms of speed and accuracy -of monetary policy and encourages the evaluation of monetary policy, engages the responsibility of the central bank and hence the credibility of monetary policy. In line with J. Faust and L.E.O. Svensson (2000) , transparency is linked to the ease with which the public can deduce the objectives and intentions of the central bank from observable elements.
Moreover, a monetary policy under an inflation targeting regime allows for accurate and real objectives in terms of Inflation (Mishkin 2004a ).
As for the principle of accountability, the conduct of monetary policy under an inflation targeting framework obliges the central bank to justify its decisions / achievements to citizens and their electoral representatives (Parliament).
Central Bank Credibility, Independence, and Monetary Policy
This counterpart of independence is a necessary condition for democratic legitimacy: independence in the short term, but political control in the long run. 
Independence of central bank
Granting independence to central banks means that no established bodies, government, parliament or any of their respective members, has the power to interfere in the decisions taken by the central bank in the performance of its mission, overthrow the course of decisions taken. The central bank should have legal autonomy free from political pressures and/or conflicts of other objectives with inflation. First, we begin our analysis with the definition of an autonomous central bank. "A central bank shall be considered autonomous or independent when it is free to implement the instrument of monetary policy conduct. In other words, it does not take account of external pressures "Chokri and Frikha (2011).
In the majority of emerging countries targeting inflation, the central bank is not free in its choice and definition of the upper limit on inflation (Batini and Laxton, 2007) , otherwise the Government will always be tempted to fix this limit at a level higher than that corresponding to the optimum equilibrium. Implementation of monetary targets is achieved by minimizing government's deficit financing by the central bank (Ftiti & al. (2017) ). The results show that the control variables are stationary for all groups. This result can be explained by the fact that turnover has the lowest value in G1, as indicated in Figures 2 and 3 . Group 1 has an average central bank governor turnover under 40%, while Groups 2 and have averages of about 25% respectively. 
Effects of IT and the role of CBI

Conclusion
The objective of this article is to broaden the analysis of benefits of targeting inflation. Recent studies tend to find conclusive results of inflation targeting on stability and economic growth in emerging economies and in advanced economies. In this work, we analyzed the role of central bank independence in the amplification of the effects of inflation targeting in emerging economies.
The implementation of such a regime requires that certain institutional prerequisites are met such as advanced technical infrastructure, soundness of the banking system, and the stability of economic structure. We can also add the importance of strategic choices such as price index, target level, target range, target horizon, and press release. According to our results, the main institutional prerequisite is central bank autonomy.
Therefore, our recommendation to emerging countries is to increase Governor turnover, in order to increase the credibility of their central banks` commitment to the objective of price stability, Which makes, it possible to judge the performance of the inflation targeting policy on the basis of the stability effect of the macroeconomic environment and, in particular ,the monetary policy environment.
